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ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHIES OF PENAL LAW. III.1
2

HERBERT SPENCER.

THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT.

The two antagonist theories of morals, like many other antagonist theories, are both right and both wrong. The a priori school has
its truth; the a posteriori school has its truth; and for the proper
*
guidance of conduct, there must be due recognition of both. *
The general reasons we gave for thinking that the ethics of immediate
experience must be enlightened by abstract ethics, to ensure correct
guidance, are strongly enforced by these instances of the gigantic
errors which are made when the dictates of abstract ethics are ignored. The complex estimates of relative expediency cannot do without the clue furnished by the simple deductions of absolute
expediency.
We propose to study the treatment of criminals from this point
of view. And first, let us set down those temporary requirements
which have hitherto prevented, and do still, in part, prevent the
establishment of a just system.
The same average popular character which necessitates a rigorous form of government necessitates also a rigorous criminal code.
Institutions are ultimately determined by the natures of the citizens
living under them; and when these citizens are too impulsive or selfish
for free institutions, and unscrupulous enough to supply the requisite staff of agents for maintaining tyrannical institutions, they are
proved by implication to be citizens who will tolerate, and will probably need, severe forms of punishment. The same mental defect
underlies both results. The character which originates and sus'In this series of articles will be presented, from time to time, representative
passages from the writings of those EngliSh and American thinkers who have
advanced a philosophy of penal law. Only those thinkers will be selected (so
far as feasible) who stand eminent in general philosophical science and have
treated penal law as a part of their system. The series will be edited by Mr.
Longwell, instructor in philosophy; Mr. Kocourek, lecturer on jurisprudence, and
Mr. Wigmore, professor of law in Northwestern University.-EDs.
'This essay, under the title, "Prison Ethics,". was originally published in
the British Quarterly Review, July, i86o; it is sometimes and better known
by the above title. It is here reprinted from the Library Edition (London:
Williams & Norgate, 19Ol) of Spencer's "Essays: Scientific, Political, and
Speculative," Vol. III, p. 152. Portions describing certain prison systems have
been omitted.-EDS.
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tains .political liberty is a character swayed by remote considerations
-a character not at the mercy of immediate temptations, but one
which contemplates the consequences likely to arise in future. We
have only to remember that, among ourselves, a political encroachruent is resisted, not because of any direct evil it inflicts, but because of the evils likely hereafter to flow fronm it, to see how the
maintenance of freedom presupposes the habit of weighing distant results, and being chiefly guided by them. Conversely, it is manifest
that men who dwell only in the present, the special, the concretewho do not realize with clearness the contingencies of the futurewill put little value on those rights of citizenship which profit them
nothing, save as a means of warding off unspecified evils that can possibly affect them only at a distant time in an obscure way. Well,
is it not obvious that the forms of mind thus contrasted will require different kinds of punishment for misconduct? To restrain
the second, there must be penalties which are severe, prompt, and
specific enough to be vividly conceived; while the first may be deterred by penalties which are less definite, less intense, less immediate.
For the more civilized, dread of a long, monotonous, criminal discipline may suffice; but for the less civilized there must be inflictions
of bodily pain and death.
Thus we hold, not only that a social condition which generates a
harsh form of government also generates harsh retributions; but
also, that, in such a social condition, harsh retributions are requisite.
And there are facts which illustrate this. Witness the case of one
of the Italian states, in which the punishment of death having been
abolished in conformity with the wish of a dying duchess, assassinations increased so greatly that it became needful to re-establish it.
But while we thus admit all that can be alleged by the defenders
of Draconian codes, we go on to assert a correlative truth which
they overlook. While fully recognizing the evils that must follow the
premature establishment of a penal system dictated by pure equity,
let us not overlook the evils that have arisen from altogether rejecting the guidance of pure equity. Let us note how terribly the
one-sided regard for immediate expediency has retarded the ameliorations from time to time demanded. Consider, for instance, the immense amount of suffering and demoralization needlessly caused by
our severe laws in the last century. Those many merciless penalties
which Romilly and others succeeded in abolishing were as little justified by social necessities as by abstract morality. Experience has
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since proved that to hang men for theft was not requisite for the
security of property. And that such a measure was opposed to
pure equity, scarcely needs saying. Evidently, had considerations of
relative expediency been all along qualified by considerations of absolute expediency, these severities, with their many concomitant evils,
would have ceased long before they did. Again, the dreadful misery,
demoralization, and crime, generated by the harsh treatment of transported convicts, would have been impossible, had our authorities considered what seemed just as well as what seemed politic. * * *
"But how can it be shown," asks the reader, "that these injudicious penal systems are inequitable? Where is the method which
will enable us to say what kind of punishment is justified by absolute
morality, and what kind is not?" These questions we will now attempt to answer.
So long as the individual citizen pursues the objects of his desires without diminishing the equal freedom of any of his fellow citizens to do the like, society cannot equitably interfere with him. While
he contents himself with the benefits won by his own energies, and attempts not to intercept any of the benefits similarly won for themselves by others, or any of those which Nature has conferred on
them, no legal penalties can rightly be inflicted on him. But when,
by murder, theft, assault, arson, or minor aggression, he has broken
through these limits, the community is warranted in putting him
under restraint. On the relative propriety of doing this we need
say nothing: it is demonstrated by social experience. Its absolute
propriety not being so manifest, we will proceed to point out how it
is deducible from the ultimate laws of life.
. Life depends on the maintenance of certain natural relations between actions and their results. If respiration does not supply oxygen to the blood, as in the normal order of things it should do, but
instead supplies carbonic acid, death quickly results. If the swallowing of food is not followed by the usual organic sequences-the contractions of the stomach, and the pouring into it of gastric juiceindigestion arises, and the energies flag. If active movements of
the limbs fail in exciting the heart to supply blood more rapidly, or
if the extra current propelled by the heart is greatly retarded by an
aneurism through which it passes, speedy prostration ensues. In
which, and endless like cases, we see that bodily life depends on the
maintenance of the established connections between physiological
causes and their consequences. Among the intellectual processes, the
same thing holds. If certain impressions made on the senses do not
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induce the appropriate muscular adjustments-if the brain is clouded
with wine, or consciousness is preoccupied, or the perceptions are
naturally obtuse, the movements are so ill-controlled that accidents
happen. Where, as in paralytic patients, the natural link between
mental impressions and the appropriate motions is broken, the life
is greatly vitiated. And when, as during insanity, evidence fitted,
according to the usual order of thought, to produce certain convictions produces convictions of an opposite kind, conduct is reduced to
chaos, and life endangered-perhaps cut short. So it is with more
involved phenomena. Just as we here find that, throughout both its
physical and intellectual divisions, healthful life implies continuance
of the established successions of antecedents and consequents among
our vital actions, so shall we find it throughout the moral division. In
our dealings with external Nature and our fellow men, there are
relations of cause and effect, on the maintenance of which, as on the
maintenance of the internal ones above instanced, life depends. Conduct of this or that kind tends to bring results which are pleasurable
or painful; and the welfare of everyone demands that these natural
sequences shall not be interfered with. To speak more specifically,
we see that in the order of Nature inactivity entails want. There is
a connection between exertion and the fulfilment of certain imperative
needs. If, now, this connection is broken-if labor of body or mind
has been gone through, and the produce of the labor is intercepted
by another, one of the conditions to complete life is unfulfilled. The
defrauded person is physically injured by deprivation of the wherewithal to make good the wear and tear he had undergone; and if
the robbery be continually repeated, he must die. Where all men are
dishonest a reflex evil results. When, throughout a society, the nornal relation between work and benefit is habitually broken, not only
are the lives of many directly undermined, but the lives of all are
indirectly undermined by destruction of the motive for work, and
by the consequent poverty. Thus, to demand that there shall be no
breach of the natural sequence between labor and the rewards obtained by labor, is to demand that the laws of life shall be respected.
What we call the rights of property is simply a corollary from
certain necessary conditions to complete living. It is a formulated
recognition'of the relation between expenditure of force and the need
for force-sustaining objects obtainable by the expenditure of forcea recognition in full of a relation which cannot be wholly ignored
without causing death. And all else regarded as individual rights
are indirect implications of like nature-similarly insist on certain
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relations between man and man, as conditions without which there
cannot be fully maintained that correspondence between inner and
outer actions which constitutes life. It is not, as some moralists and
most lawyers absurdly assert, that such rights are derived from
human legislation; nor is it, as asserted by others with absurdty
almost as great, that there is no basis for them save the inductions
of immediate expediency. These rights are deducible from the established connections between our acts and their results. As certainly
as there are conditions which must be fulfilled before life can exist,
so certainly are there conditions which must be fulfilled before complete life can be enjoyed by the respective members of a society; and
those which we call the requirements of justice simply answer to the
most important of such conditions.
Hence, if life is our legitimate aim-if absolute morality means,
as it does, conformity to the laws of complete life, then absolute
morality warrants the restraint of those who force their fellowcitizens into non-conformity. Our justification is, that life is impossible save under certain conditions; that it cannot be entire unless
these conditions are maintained unbroken; and that if it is right for
us to live completely, it is right for us to remove anyone who either
breaks these conditions in our persons or constrains us to break
them.
Such being the basis of our right to coerce the criminal, there
next come the questions :-What is the legitimate extent of the coercion? Can we from this source derive authority for certain demands on him, and are there any similarly-derived limits to such demands? To both these questions there are affirmative answers.
First, we find authority for demanding restitution or compensation. Conformity to the laws of life being the substance of absolute
morality, and the social regulations which absolute morality dictates being those which make this conformity possible; it is a manifest corollary that whoever breaks these regulations may be justly
required to undo, as far as possible, the wrong he has done. The
object being to maintain the conditions essential to complete life,
it follows that, when one of these conditions has been transgressed,
the first thing to be required of the transgressor is, that he shall put
matters as nearly as may be in the state they previously were. The
property stolen shall be restored, or an equivalent for it given. Anyone injured by an assault shall have his surgeon's bill paid, compensation for lost time, and also for the suffering he has borne. And
similarly in all cases "of infringed rights.
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HERBERT SPENCER

Second, we are warranted by this highest authority in restricting the actions of the offender as much as is needful to prevent further aggressions. Any citizen who will not allow others to fulfill the
conditions to complete life-who takes away the produce of his
neighbor's labor, or deducts from that bodily health and comfort
which his neighbor has earned by good conduct, must be forced to desist. And society is warranted in using such force as may be found
requisite. Equity justifies the fellow-citizens of such a man in limiting the free exercise of his faculties to the extent necessary for preserving the free exercise of their own faculties.
But now mark that absolute morality countenances no restraint
beyond this-no gratuitous inflictions of pain, no revengeful penalties. The conditions it insists on being such as make possible complete life, we cannot rightly abrogate these conditions, even in the
person of a criminal, further than is needful to prevent greater abrogations of them. Freedom to fulfill the laws of life being the thing
insisted on, to the end that the sum of life may be the greatest possible, it follows that the life of the offender must be taken into account as an item in this sum. We must permit him to live as com- 1
pletely as consists with social safety. It is commonly said that the'
criminal loses all his rights. This may be so, according to law, but it
is not so according to justice. Such portion of them only is justly
taken away as cannot be left to him without danger to the community. Those exercises of faculty, and consequent benefits, which
are possible under the necessary restraint, cannot be equitably denied.
If any do not think it proper that we should be thus regardful of an
offender's claims, let them consider for a moment the lesson which
Nature reads us. We do not find that those processes of life by which
bodily health is maintained are miraculously suspended in the person
of the prisoner. In him, as in others, good digestion waits on appetite. If he is wounded, the healing process goes on with the usual
rapidity. When he is ill, as much effect is expected from the vis
medicatrix nature by the medical officer as in one who has not transgressed. His perceptions yield him guidance as they did before he
was imprisoned; and he is capable of much the same pleasurable emotions. When we thus see that the beneficent arrangements of things
are no less uniformly sustained in his person than in that of another,
are we not bound to respect in his person such of these beneficent
arrangements as we have power to thwart; are we not bound to interfere with the laws of life no further than is needful? If any still
hesitate, there is another lesson for them having the same implication.

THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT

Whoso disregards any one of those simpler laws of life out of which,
as we have shown, the moral laws originate, has to bear the evil
necessitated by the transgression-just that, and no more. If, careless of your footing, you fall, the consequent bruise, and possibly
some constitutional disturbance entailed by it, are all you have to
suffer; there is not the further gratuitous penalty of a cold or an
attack of smallpox. If you have eaten something Which you know to
be indigestible, there follow certain visceral derangements and their
concomitants; but, for your physical sin, there is no vengeance in
the shape of a broken bone or a spinal affection. The punishments,
in these and other cases, are neither greater nor less than flow from
the natural workings of things. Well, should we not with all humility follow this example? Must we not infer that, similarly, a citizen
who has transgressed the conditions to social welfare ought to bear
the needful penalties and restraints, but nothing beyond these? Is
it not clear that neither by absolute morality nor by Nature's precedents are we warranted in visiting on him any pains besides those involved in remedying, as far as may be, the evil committed, and preventing other such evils? To us it seems manifest that if society exceeds this, it trespasses against the criminal.
Those who think that we are tending towards a mischievous
leniency, you will find that the next step in our argument disposes
of any such objection; for while equity forbids us to punish the
criminal otherwise than by making him suffer the natural consequences, these, when rigorously enforced, are quite severe enough.
Society having proved, in the high court of absolute morality,
that the offender must make restitution or compensation, and submit
to the restraints requisite for public safety, and the offender having
obtained from the same court the decision that these restraints shall
be no greater than the specified end requires, society thereupon makes
the further demand that, while living in durance, the offender shall
maintain himself; and this demand absolute morality at once endorses. The community having taken measures for self-preservation,
and having inflicted on the aggressor no punishments or disabilities
beyond those involved in these necessary measures, is no further concerned in the matter. With the support of the prisoner it has no
more to do than before he committed the crime. It is the business of
society simply to defend itself against him; and it is his business to
live as well as he can under the restrictions society is obliged to impose on him. All he may rightly ask is, to have the opportunity of
laboring, and exchanging the produce of his labor for necessaries;
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and this claim is a corollary from that already admitted, that his
actions shall not be restricted more than is needful for the public
safety. With these opportunities, however, he must make the best of
his position. He must be content to gain as good a livelihood as
the circumstances permit; and if he cannot employ his powers to the
best advantage, if he has to work hard and fare scantily, these evils
must be counted among the penalties of his transgression-the natural reactions of his wrong action.
On this self-maintenance equity sternly insists. The reasons
which justify his imprisonment equally justify the refusal to let
him have any other sustenance than he earns. He is confined that he
may not further interfere with the complete living of his fellowcitizens-that he may not again intercept any of those benefits which
the order of Nature has conferred on them, or any of those procured
by their exertions and careful conduct. And he is required to support himself for exactly the same reasons-that he may not interfere
with others' complete living-that he may not intercept the benefits
they earn. For, if otherwise, whence must come his food and clothing? Directly from the public stores, and indirectly from the pockets
of all taxpayers. And what is the property thus abstracted from
tax-payers? It is the equivalent of so much benefit earned by labor.
It is so much means to complete living. And when this property is
taken away-when the toil has been gone through, and the produce
of it is intercepted by the tax-gatherer on behalf of the convict, the
conditions to a complete life are broken; the convict commits by
deputy a further aggression on his fellow-citizens. It matters not
that such abstraction is made according to law. We are here considering the dictum of that authority which is above law, and which
law ought to enforce. And this dictum we find to be, that each individual shall take the evils and benefits of his own conduct-that the
offender must suffer, as far as is possible, all pains entailed by his
offense, and must not be allowed to visit part of them on the unoffending. Unless the criminal maintains himself he indirectly commits an additional crime. Instead of repairing the breach he has
made in the conditions to complete social life, he widens this breach.
He inflicts on others that very injury which the restraint imposed on
him was to prevent. As certainly, therefore, as such restraint is
warranted by absolute morality, so certainly does absolute morality
warrant us in refusing him gratuitous support.
These, then, are the requirements of an equitable penal systemThat the aggressor shall make restitution or compensation; that he
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shall be placed under the restraints requisite for social security; that
neither any restraints beyond these, nor any gratuitous penalties,
shall be inflicted on him; and that while living in confinement, or
under surveillance, be shall maintain himself. We are not prepared
to say that such dictates may at once be fully obeyed. Already we
have admitted that the deductions of absolute expediency must, in our
transition state, be qualified by the inductions of relative expediency.
We have pointed out that in rude times the severest criminal codes
were morally justified if, without them, crime could not be repressed
and social safety insured. Whence, by implication, it follows that
our present methods of treating criminals are warranted, if they come
as near to those of pure equity as circumstances permit. That any
system now feasible must fall short of the ideal sketched out, is
probable. It may be that the enforcement of restitution or compensation is in many cases impracticable. It may be that on some convicts penalties more severe than abstract justice demands must be
inflicted. On the other hand, it may be that entire self-maintenance
would entail on the wholly-unskilled criminal a punishment too
grievous to be borne. But any such shortcomings do not affect our
argument. All we insist on is, that the commands of absolute morality
shall be obeyed as far as possible-that we shall fulfill them up to
those limits beyond which experiment proves that more evil than
good results-that, ever keeping in view the ideal, each change we
make shall be towards its realization.
But now we are prepared to say that this ideal may be in great
part realized at the present time. Experience in various countries,
under various circumstances, has shown that immense benefits result from substituting for the old penal systems, systems that approximate to that above indicated. Germany, France, Spain, England, Ireland and Australia send statements to the effect that the
most successful criminal discipline is a discipline of decreased restraints and increased self-dependence. And the evidence proves the
success to be greatest where the nearest approach is made to the arrangements prescribed by abstract justice. We shall find the facts
striking, some of them even astonishing.
* *
And now let us try whether, by pursuing somewhat further the
method thus far followed, we can see our way to the development of
certain improved systems which are coming into use.
Equity requires that the restraint of the criminal shall be as
great as is needful for the safety of society; but not greater. In
respect to the quality of the restraint, there is little difficulty inter-
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preting this requirement; but there is considerable difficulty in deciding on the duration of the restraint. No obvious mode presents
itself of finding out how long a transgressor must be held in legal
bondage, to insure society against further injury from him.
A
longer period than is necessary implies an actual injustice to the
offender. A shorter period than is necessary implies a potential
injustice to society. And yet, without good guidance, one or other
of these extremes is almost sure to be fallen into.
At present, the lengths of penal sentences are fixed in a manner
that is wholly empirical. For offenses defined in certain technical
ways, Acts of Parliament assign transportations and imprisonments,
having durations not greater than so much nor less than so much,
these partially-determined periods being arbitrarily fixed by legislators, under the promptings of moral feeling. Within the assigned
limits the judge exercises his discretion; and in deciding on the time
over which the restraint shall extend, he is swayed, partly by the
special quality of the offense, partly by the circumstances under
which it was committed, partly by the prisoner's appearance and behavior, partly by the chafacter given to him. And the conclusion he
arrives at after consideration of these data depends very much on
his individual nature-his moral bias and his theories of human conduct. Thus the mode of fixing the lengths of penal restraints is,
from beginning to end, little else than guessing. How ill this system of guessing works, we have abundant proofs. "Justices' justice,"
which illustrates it in its simplest form, has become a by-word; and
the decisions of higher criminal court frequently err in the directions
of both undue severity and undue lenity. Daily there occur cases of
extremely-trifling transgressions visited with imprisonments of considerable lengths; and daily there occur cases in which the punishments are so inadequate that the offenders time after time commit
new crimes, when time after time discharged from custody.
Now the question is whether, in place of this purely empirical
method which answers so ill, equity can guide us to a method which
shall more correctly adjust the period of restraint to the requirement.
We believe it can. We believe that by following out its dictates, we
shall arrive at a method that is in great measure self-acting, and
therefore less liable to be vitiated by errors of individual judgment
or feeling.
We have seen that were the injunctions of absolute morality
obeyed, every transgressor would be compelled to make restitution
or compensation. Throughout a considerable range of cases, this
871
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would itself involve a period of restraint varying in proportion to
the magnitude of the offense. It is true that when the malefactor
possessed ample means, the making restitution or compensation would
usually be to him but a slight punishment. But though in these comparatively few cases the regulation would fall short of its object, in
so far as its effect on the criminal was concerned, yet in the immense
majority of cases-in all cases of aggressions committed by the
poorer members of the community-it would act with efficiency. It
v,ould involve periods of detention that would be longer or shorter
according as the injury done was greater or less, and according as
the transgressor was idle or industrious. And although between the
injury done by an offender and his moral turpitude, there is no constant and exact proportion, yet the greatness of the injury done
affords, on the average of cases, a better measure of the discipline
required than do the votes of Parliamentary majorities and the
guesses of judges.
But our guidance does not end here. An endeavor still further
to do that which is strictly equitable will carry us still nearer to a
correct adjustment of discipline to delinquency. When, having enforced restitution, we insist on some adequate guarantee that society
shall not again be injured, and accept any guarantee that is sufficient, we open the way to a self-acting regulator of the period of
detention. Already our laws are in many cases satisfied with securities for future good behavior. Already this system manifestly tends
to separate the more vicious from the less vicious, seeing that, on the
average, the difficulty of finding securities is great in proportion as
the character is bad. And what we propose is that this system, now
confined to particular kinds of offenses, shall be made general. But
let us be more specific.
A prisoner on his trial calls witnesses, to testify to his previous
character-that is, if his character has been tolerably good. The
evidence thus given weighs more or less in his favor, according to
the respectability of the witnesses, their number, and the nature of
their testimony. Taking into account these several elements, the
judge forms his conception of the delinquent's general disposition,
and modifies the length of punishment accordingly. Now, may we
not fairly say that if the current opinion respecting a convict's character could be brought directly to bear in qualifying the statutory
sentence, instead of being brought indirectly to bear, as at present,
it would be a great improvement? Clearly the estimate made by a
judge from such testimony must be less accurate than the estimate
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made by the prisoner's neighbors and employers. Clearly, too, the
opinion expressed by such neighbors and employers in the witnessbox is less trustworthy than an opinion which entails on them serious responsibility. The desideratum is, that a prisoner's sentence
shall be qualified by the judgment of those who have had life-long
experience of him; and that the sincerity of this judgment shall be
tested by their readiness to act on it.
But how is this to be done? A very simple method of doing it
has been suggested.' When a convict has fulfilled his task of making
restitution or compensation, let it be possible for one or other of
those who have known him to take him out of confinement, on giving
adequate bail for his good behavior. Always premising that such an
arrangement shall be possible only under an official permit, to be
withheld if the prisoner's conduct has been unsatisfactory, and always premising that the person who offers bail shall be of good character and means, let it be competent for such a one to liberate a
prisoner by being bound on his behalf for a specific sum, or by undertaking to make good any injury which he may do to his fellowcitizens within a specified period. This will doubtless be thought a
startling proposal. We shall, however, find good reasons to believe it might be safely acted on-nay, we shall find facts proving
the success of a plan that is obviously less safe.
Under such an arrangement, the liberator and the convict would
usually stand in the relation of employer and employed. Those to
be thus conditionally released would be ready to work for somewhat
lower wages than were usual in their occupation; and those who became bound for them, besides having this economy of wages as an
incentive, would be guaranteed by it against the risk undertaken.
In working for less money, and in being under the surveillance of
his master, the convict would still be undergoing a mitigated discipline. And while, on the one hand, he would be put on his good
behavior by the consciousness that his master might at any time cancel the contract and surrender him back to the authorities, he would,
on the other hand, have a remedy against his master's harshness, in
the option of returning to prison, and there maintaining himself for
the remainder of his term.
Observe, next, that the difficulty of obtaining such conditional
release would vary with the gravity of the offense which had been
committed. Men guilty of heinous crimes would remain in prison;
'We owe the suggestion to the late Mr. Octavius H. Smith.
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for none would dare to become responsible for their good behavior.
Anyone convicted a second time would remain unbailed for a much
longer period than before, seeing that having once inflicted loss on
someone bound for him, he would not again be so soon offered the
opportunity of doing the like; only after a long period of good
behavior testified to by prison-officers, would he be likely to get another chance. Conversely, those whose transgressions were not serious, and who had usually been well-conducted, would readily obtain recognizances; while to venial offenders this qualified liberation
would come as soon as they had made restitution. Moreover, when
innocent persons had been pronounced guilty, as well as when solitary misdeeds had been committed by those of really superior natures, the system we have described would supply a remedy. From
the wrong verdicts of the law and its mistaken estimates of turpitude,
there would be an appeal; and long-proved worth would bring its
reward in the mitigation of grievous injustices.
A further advantage would by implication result in the shape
of a long industrial discipline for those who most needed it. Speaking generally, diligent and skillful workmen, who were on the whole
useful members of society, would, if their offenses were not serious,
soon obtain employers to give bail for them. Whereas members of
the criminal class-the idle and the dissolute-would remain long in
confinement; since, until they had been brought, by habitual selfmaintenance under restraint, to something like industrial efficiency,
employers would not be tempted to become responsible for them.
We should thus have a self-acting test, not only of the length
of restraint required for social safety, but also of that apprenticeship to labor which many convicts need; while there would be supplied a means of rectifying sundry failures and excesses of our present system. The plan would practically amount to an extension of
trial by jury. At present, the State calls in certain of a prisoner's
fellow-citizens to decide whether he is guilty or not guilty, the judge,
under guidance of the penal laws, being left to decide what punishment he deserves, if guilty. Under the arrangement .we have described
the judge's decision would admit of modification by a jury of the
convict's neighbors. And this natural jury, while it would be best
fitted by previous knowledge of the man to form an opinion, would
be rendered cautious by the sense of grave responsibility; inasmuch
as any one of its number who gave a conditional release would do so
at his own peril.
And now mark that all the evidence forthcoming to prove the
874
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safety and advantages of the "intermediate system" proves, still
more conclusively, the safety and advantages of this system which we
would substitute for it. What we have described is nothing more
than an intermediate system reduced to a natural instead of an artificial form-carried out with natural checks instead of artificial
checks. If, as Captain Crofton has experimentally shown, it is safe
to give a prisoner conditional liberation, on the strength of good
conduct during a certain period of prison-discipline, it is evidently
safer to let his conditional liberation depend not alone on good
conduct while under the eyes of his jailors, but also on the character
he had earned during his previous life. If it is safe to act on the
judgments of officials whose experience of a convict's behavior is comparatively limited, and who do not suffer penalties when their judgments are mistaken, then, manifestly, it is safer (when such officials
can show no reason to the contrary) to act on the additional judgment of one who has not only had better opportunities of knowing
the convict, but who will be a serious loser if his judgment proves
erroneous. Further, that surveillance over each conditionally-liberated prisoner, which the "intermediate system" exercises, would be
still better exercised when, instead of going to a strange master in a
strange district, the prisoner went to some master in his own district; and, under such circumstances, it would be easier to get information respecting his after-career. There is every reason to think
that this method would be workable. If, on the recommendation of
the officers, Captain Crofton's prisoners obtain employers "who have
on many occasions returned for others, in consequence of the good
conduct of those at first engaged," still better would be the action of
the system when, instead of the employers having "every facility
placed at their disposal for satisfying themselves as to the antecedents of the convict," they were already familiar with his antecedents.
Finally, let us not overlook the fact that this course is the only
one which, while duly consulting social safety, is also entirely just to
the prisoner. As we have shown, the restraints imposed on a criminal
are warranted by absolute equity, only to the extent needful to prevent further aggressions on his fellow-men; and when his fellow-men
impose greater restraints than these, they trespass against him.
Hence, when a prisoner has worked out his task of making restitution, and, so far as is possible, undone the wrong he had done, society is, in strict justice, bound to accept any arrangement which
adequately protects its members against further injury. And if,
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moved by the expectation of profit, or other motive, any citizen sufficiently substantial and trustworthy will take on himself to hold
society harmless, society must agree to his proposal. All it can
rightly require'is, that the guarantee against contingent injury shall
be adequate; which, of course, it never can be where the contingent
injury is of the gravest kind. No bail could compensate for murder; and therefore against this, and other extreme crimes, society
would rightly refuse any such guarantee, even if offered, which it
would be very unlikely to be.
Such, then, is our code of prison-ethics. Such is the ideal which
we ought to keep ever in view when modifying our penal system.
Again we say, as we said at the outset, that the realization of such
an ideal wholly depends on the advance of civilization. Let no one
carry away the impression that we regard all these purely equitable
regulations as immediately practicable. Though they may be partially carried out, we think it highly improbable that they could at
present be carried out in full. The number of offenders, the low average of enlightenment, the ill-working of administrative machinery,
and above all, the difficulty of obtaining officials of adequate intelligence, good feeling, and self-control, are obstacles which must long
stand in the way of a system so complex as that which morality dictates. And we here assert, as emphatically as before, that the harshest penal system is ethically justified if it is as good ast the circumstances of the time permit. However great the cruelties it inflicts,
yet if a system theoretically more equitable would not be a sufficient
terror to evil-doers, or could not be worked, from lack of officers
sufficiently judicious, honest, and humane-if less rigorous methods
would entail a diminution of social security, then the methods in use
are extrinsically good though intrinsically bad. They are, as before said, the least wrong, and therefore relatively right.

